Excerpts:
(…) During the 1990s, even as we tried to predict what form the threats of the 21st century would take, Afghanistan was, in reality becoming exactly what we were discussing in theory. Subsequent events during the intervening years have shown that:
• Instability and conflict abroad have the potential to spread and strike directly at the hearts of our nations;
• New technology and communications connect criminal and terrorist networks far and wide, and allow local problems to become regional and even global;
• Economic, social, and humanitarian problems caused by massive immigration flows radiate outward with little regard for national borders;
• A nexus between narcotics and terrorists increases the resources available to extremists in the region, while increasing the drug flow to European streets; and
• The presence of safe havens, combined with a lack of development and governance, allow Islamic extremists to turn a poisonous ideology into a global movement. (…)(…) Since the Riga summit, there has been much focus on whether all allies are meeting their commitments and carrying their share of the burden. I have had a few things to say about that myself. In truth, virtually all allies are fulfilling the individual commitments they have made. The problem is that the Alliance as a whole has not fulfilled its broader commitment from Riga to meet the force requirements of the commander in the field.
As we think about how to satisfy those requirements, we should look more creatively at other ways to ensure that all allies can contribute more to this mission – and share this burden. But we must not – we cannot – become a two-tiered Alliance of those who are willing to fight and those who are not. Such a development, with all its implications for collective security, would effectively destroy the Alliance.
As many of you know, a Strategic Vision document is being drafted that will assess NATO’s and our partners’ achievements in Afghanistan, and will produce a set of realistic goals and a roadmap to meet them over the next three to five years. We continue urgently to need a senior civilian – a European in my view – to coordinate all non-military international assistance to the Afghan government and people. The lack of such coordination is seriously hampering our efforts to help the Afghans build a free and secure country. (…)
(…) The Alliance must put aside any theology that attempts clearly to divide civilian and military operations. It is unrealistic. We must live in the real world. As we noted as far back as 1991, in the real world, security has economic, political, and social dimensions. And vice versa. In the future, the E.U. and NATO will have to find ways to work together better, to share certain roles – neither excluding NATO from civilian-military operations nor barring the E.U. from purely military missions. In short, I agree entirely with Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and Minister Morin’s comments yesterday that there must be a “complimentarity” between the E.U. and NATO.
At the same time, in NATO, some allies ought not to have the luxury of opting only for stability and civilian operations, thus forcing other Allies to bear a disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying. (…)
(…) My colleagues in Vilnius and those in this room certainly understand the serious threat we face in Afghanistan. But I am concerned that many people on this continent may not comprehend the magnitude of the direct threat to European security. (…)
(…) Many Europeans question the relevance of our actions and doubt whether the mission is worth the lives of their sons and daughters. As a result, many want to remove their troops. The reality of fragile coalition governments makes it difficult to take risks. And communicating the seriousness of the threat posed by Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Europe, and globally remains a steep challenge.
As opinion leaders and government officials, we are the ones who must make the case publicly and persistently. (…)
Very important point Minister Gates is making here. Sadly, I do not see this happening in Germany at all. Horst Teltschik when introducing Robert Gates said: “Sometimes leadership is more important than opinion polls.” I agree, but at the same time I suspect there are not many politicians in Germany (still in office) sharing this view. I can only hope that many Germans will hear this part of Robert Gates` speech:
So now I would like to add my voice to those of many allied leaders and speak directly to the people of Europe: The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism is real – and it is not going away. You know all too well about the attacks in Madrid and London. But there have also been multiple smaller attacks in Istanbul, Amsterdam, Paris, and Glasgow, among others. Numerous cells and plots have been disrupted in recent years as well – many of them seeking large-scale death and destruction, such as:
• A complex plot to down multiple airliners over the Atlantic that could have killed hundreds or even thousands;
• A plot to use ricin and release cyanide in the London Underground;
• A separate plan for a chemical attack in the Paris metro;
• Plots in Belgium, England, and Germany involving car bombs that could have killed hundreds;
• Homemade bombs targeting commuter and high-speed trains in Spain and Germany;
• Individuals arrested in Bosnia with explosives, a suicide belt, and an instructional propaganda video;
• Two plots in Denmark involving explosives, fertilizer, and a bomb-making video; and
• Just in the last few weeks, Spanish authorities arrested 14 Islamic extremists in Barcelona suspected of planning suicide attacks against public transport systems in Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, and Britain.Imagine, for a moment, if some or all of these attacks had come to pass. Imagine if Islamic terrorists had managed to strike your capitals on the same scale as they struck in New York. Imagine if they had laid their hands on weapons and materials with even greater destructive capability – weapons of the sort all too easily accessible in the world today. We forget at our peril that the ambition of Islamic extremists is limited only by opportunity.
We should also remember that terrorist cells in Europe are not purely homegrown or unconnected to events far away – or simply a matter of domestic law and order. Some are funded from abroad. Some hate all western democracies, not just the United States. Many who have been arrested have had direct connections to Al Qaeda. Some have met with top leaders or attended training camps abroad. (…)
(…) I am not indulging in scare tactics. Nor am I exaggerating either the threat or inflating the consequences of a victory for extremists. Nor am I saying that the extremists are ten feet tall. The task before us is to fracture and destroy this movement in its infancy – to permanently reduce its ability to strike globally and catastrophically, while deflating its ideology. Our best opportunity as an alliance to do this is in Afghanistan. Just as the hollowness of Communism was laid bare with the collapse of the Soviet Union, so too would success in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, strike a decisive blow against what some commentators have called Al Qaeda-ism.
This is a steep challenge. But the events of the last year have proven one thing above all else: If we are willing to stand together, we can prevail. It will not be quick, and it will not be easy – but it can be done. (…)
(…) From our present-day vantage point, victory in the Cold War now seems almost preordained. But as we prepare to celebrate NATO’s 60th anniversary next year, it is useful to recall that 60 years ago, in 1948, the year of the Berlin airlift, few people would have been all that optimistic about the future of Europe, or the prospect of a Western alliance. The Continent was devastated, its economy in shambles. The United States was debating the European recovery program – known as the Marshall Plan – and faced a resurgent isolationism. Europe was under siege – with pressure from communism being felt in Germany, France, Finland, Norway, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Greece.
In January of that year, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, went before parliament to discuss the Soviet Union and other threats to the United Kingdom. Between all the “kindred souls of the West,” he said, “there should be an effective understanding bound together by common ideals for which the Western Powers have twice in one generation shed their blood.”
Less than two months later, President Harry Truman stood in the United States Congress and echoed that sentiment. He said: “The time has come when the free men and women of the world must face the threat to their liberty squarely and courageously . . . Unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of spirit are essential to accomplish the task before us.” (…)
(…) Many years from now, perhaps future generations will look back on this period and say, “victory seemed almost preordained.”